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Why	rejoining	the	Commonwealth	is	such	an	enticing
prospect	for	Zimbabwe’s	new	regime
Sue	Onslow	explores	why	rejoining	the	Commonwealth	is	an	attractive	proposition	for	Zimbabwe’s	new	President.
	
Rejoining	the	Commonwealth	has	been	a	key	element	of	the	mood	music	of	Zimbabwe’s	foreign	policy	of	‘robust
reengagement’	with	the	international	community	under	President	Emmerson	Mnangagwa.	At	first	glance,	this	seems
something	of	a	diversion	from	the	pressing	domestic	issues	facing	the	new	ZANU-PF	leadership.	International
commentators	were	quick	to	point	out	last	November	that	the	parlous	state	of	the	Zimbabwean	economy	demanded
massive	foreign	direct	investment	and	emergency	lines	of	credit	to	address	multi-lateral	debt,	as	well	as	re-
engagement	with	the	Lima	Process.	Furthermore,	there	were	issues	of	rampant	corruption,	the	acute	cash	shortage,
woefully	depleted	public	services,	and	pressing	need	for	reform	in	the	public	sector	where	civil	service	salaries
consume	nearly	90	per	cent	of	state	expenditure.		Yet,	signs	of	Zimbabwe’s	reengagement	rapidly	gathered
momentum.	In	a	statement	in	the	House	of	Commons	on	20	November	2017,	UK	Foreign	Secretary	Boris	Johnson
‘backed	[Zimbabwe’s]	“fine	and	noble	aspiration”	[of	re-joining	the	Commonwealth],	but	stressed	the	African	nation
had	much	to	do	to	restore	its	international	reputation	before	it	could	be	welcomed	back.’	Scarcely	a	week	later,
following	on	from	the	then	UK	Minister	for	Africa	Rory	Stewart’s	lightening	visit	to	Harare	to	meet	newly-inaugurated
President	Mnangagwa,	the	Times	of	London	reported	Zimbabwe	had	opened	talks	with	the	UK	about	‘rejoining	the
Commonwealth’.
Zimbabwe’s	President	Mnangagwa	has	made	rejoining	the	Commonwealth	a	key	priority	for	his
government	Image	Credit:	UN	Geneva	via	Flickr	CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0
Intrigued	by	this	seeming	unlikely	alignment	of	British	foreign	policy	with	the	‘new	dispensation’	in	Zimbabwe,	I	visited
Harare	in	mid-January	to	investigate	the	level	of	interest	in	this	issue,	and	to	ask	why	was	renewed	membership	of
this	financially-straitened	‘club’,	whose	relevance	is	publicly	questioned	in	the	British	media,	deemed	such	an
attractive	proposition?	Surely	Chinese	and	other	foreign	direct	investment	was	of	much	greater	importance?
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The	responses	surprised	me,	as	did	the	uniformly	positive	emphasis	that	I	had	arrived	at	an	opportune	and
appropriate	time	to	ask	these	questions.	Views	among	ordinary	Zimbabweans	in	Harare	ranged	from	the	generic	–	a
wish	for	access	to	Commonwealth	scholarships	and	the	associated	chance	to	establish	lasting	professional	networks
established	through	student	experience	at	UK	universities,	participation	in	the	Commonwealth	Games,	memories	of
Commonwealth	teachers	and	pen	friends	(representing	being	part	of	a	wider	world,	than	Zimbabwe’s	current	isolated
position)	–	to	the	specific,	most	notably	a	profound	hope	that	the	current	restrictive	UK’s	visa	regime	would	be	more
sympathetic	to	Zimbabwean	visitors	if	the	country	was	back	in	the	Commonwealth.	I	also	encountered	a	hope	that
‘robust	engagement’	with	the	Commonwealth	could	offset	Chinese	business	penetration	of	Zimbabwean	markets	by
widening	the	pool	of	possible	foreign	investors,	as	well	as	boosting	Zimbabwean	confidence	to	drive	a	harder	bargain
with	their	Chinese	business	interlocutors.	There	was	an	associated	hope	that	Commonwealth	reengagement	would
accelerate	the	removal	of	US	sanctions	and	the	few	remaining	EU	measures,	which	are	still	deemed	to	taint	the
Zimbabwean	business	environment.
At	an	elite	political	and	civil	society	level,	attitudes	were	decidedly	mixed.	I	was	warned	of	a	discernible	undertow	of
enduring	resentment	towards	the	Commonwealth	among	what	might	be	termed	the	ZANU-PF	‘hard	core’;	however,
that	there	was	also	an	emerging	dominant	view	that	reengagement	with	the	Commonwealth	would	be	a	much
needed	and	rapid	foreign	policy	success.	I	encountered	an	edge	of	outright	impatience	–	a	product	of	a	brisk,	goal-
driven	military	mindset	among	the	new	Foreign	Minister	SB	Moyo	and	his	special	advisers	–	and	friction	with	the
more	cautious	bureaucratic		attitude	of	career	diplomats	within	the	Department	of	Foreign	Affairs,	which	stressed
careful	strategies,	strict	hierarchies	and	control	of	lines	of	communication.	Among	leading	opposition	figures,	there
was	keen	interest	in	the	Commonwealth	dimension	offering	a	wider	environment	within	Africa	to	foster	change	in
Zimbabwean	institutions,	diluting	any	enduring	sense	of	a	colonial	‘axis’	between	London	and	Harare.	The
Commonwealth	was	seen	as	typifying	an	African	philosophy	of	learning	from	one	another,	therefore	detoxifying
Western	pressure	for	change.	Therefore,	domestic	sensitivities	that	Zimbabwe	was	being	hauled	into	the	dock	for
persistent	violations	or	misdemeanours,	would	be	eased	by	the	argument	of	Commonwealth	African	countries
already	possessed	a	template	for,	say,	security	sector	reform,	or	local	government	administration	and	engagement
with	wider	society,	which	the	Zimbabwean	government	could	usefully	emulate.	(This	viewpoint	came	from	a	leading
member	of	the	Parliamentary	committee	on	multilateral	engagement.)	There	was	also	the	desire	for	knowledge
transfers	in	how	to	handle	international	negotiations	which,	it	was	believed,	the	Commonwealth	could	support.	In
addition,	the	Commonwealth	was	seen	as	a	potential	source	of	practical	help	on	land	questions	(harking	back	to	the
assistance	the	Secretariat	offered	in	the	1990s,	in	collaboration	with	UNDP).
Overall,	I	repeatedly	encountered	the	phrase	describing	reconnection	with	the	Commonwealth	as	‘low	hanging	fruit’:
that	the	Commonwealth	offered	an	apparent	quick	diplomatic	success	for	the	ZANU-PF	government,	regaining	a	kite
mark	of	respectability	in	the	international	community,	very	much	in	keeping	with	Mnangagwa’s	instruction	to
ministries	to	achieve	discernible	success	within	100	days;	and	its	varying	forms	of	‘soft	power	penetration’	and	multi-
layered	connectivity	would	rapidly	foster	the	image	of	a	more	benign	new	dispensation,	putting	a	clear	stamp	on	the
post-Mugabe	era.	Altogether,	then,	a	reboot	of	ZANU-PF	using	foreign	policy	to	protect	the	regime,	and	continuing	to
ensure	its	political	hegemony.)
In	contrast,	there	was	acute	concern	among	opposition	MPs	and	civil	society	actors	that	by	rushing	through	re-
engagement,	the	Commonwealth	would	be	endorsing	the	unconstitutional	change	of	leadership	in	November	2017,
raising	the	likelihood	of	this	happening	again	in	Zimbabwe.	Furthermore,	the	Commonwealth	thereby	risked	debasing
its	own	moral	currency	as	a	values-based	association	committed	to	democracy,	the	rule	of	law	and	human	rights.
The	proponents	of	this	view	were	kicking	as	hard	as	they	could	against	the	‘stability’	narrative	of	accepting	the	‘soft’
or	‘non-coup’	and	concentrating	exclusively	on	economic	revitalisation.		Directly	associated	to	this	profound	anxiety,
was	the	expressed	fear	that	the	Commonwealth,	by	reengaging	too	quickly	would	simply	solidify	ZANU-PF’s
authoritarian	practices,	and	undercut	any	impetus	for	reform.	Leading	opposition	MP	Tendai	Biti,	in	particular,	was
emphatic	that	the	Commonwealth	should	negotiate	from	a	standpoint	of	distrust,	not	trust.	This	made	me	wonder
whether	this	was	symptomatic	of	fundamental	opposition	weakness	and	division	(there	are	currently	99	registered
political	parties	in	the	country),	and	redolent	of	a	hope	that	the	international	community	could	oblige	ZANU-PF	to
introduce	meaningful	change,	which	the	opposition	cannot.	The	current	government	certainly	faces	huge	challenges
in	trying	to	manage	its	narrative	of	change,	without	allowing	licence	for	vocal	criticism	and	calls	for	retribution	beyond
a	narrow	few.	The	Mnangagwa	government’s	handling	of	the	Gukurahundi	issue	is	going	to	be	a	test	case.
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I	then	watched	as	the	public	narrative	of	rapid	re-connectivity	gathered	momentum.	On	2	February,	on	her	first
overseas	visit,	the	new	UK	Minister	for	Africa,	Harriet	Baldwin	was	assured	by	the	Zimbabwean	head	of	state	that	his
country	would	re-join	the	Commonwealth	‘this	year’.	This	was	followed	shortly	afterwards	by	Foreign	Minister	SB
Moyo’s	statement	to	the	Zimbabwean	parliament	in	mid-March	that	discussions	were	underway,	culminating	in	his
visit	to	London	during	the	Commonwealth	Heads	of	Government	meeting	from	16-20	April	2018.
What	to	make	of	all	this?	Care	is	certainly	needed	not	to	conflate	improved	British-Zimbabwean	bilateral	relations
with	Zimbabwe’s	rapid	readmission	back	into	the	Commonwealth,	but	the	two	are	firmly	connected.	The	UK,
evidently	driven	by	the	energy	and	particular	input	of	the	British	Ambassador	in	Harare,	has	indeed	been	a	leading
supporter	of	Zimbabwe’s	return.	However,	although	the	UK	has	just	hosted	the	2018	Commonwealth	summit	and
consequently	was	a	crucial	player	in	setting	the	agenda	of	the	heads	of	government	meeting,	and	will	occupy	the
‘chair-in-office’	role	until	the	next	Commonwealth	summit	in	two	years’	time,	Britain	does	not	enjoy	special	privileges
within	the	association.	There	are	Commonwealth	established	processes	for	joining	the	Commonwealth	and
yardsticks	of	assessment,	which	have	evolved	since	President	Mugabe	flounced	out	of	the	Commonwealth	in
December	2003,	just	before	Zimbabwe’s	continued	suspension	for	human	rights	violations	around	the	2002
elections.
The	upcoming	elections,	due	by	August	2018,	are	going	to	be	a	vital	yardstick	to	assess	Zimbabwe’s	democratisation
processes	and	progress.	Mnangagwa	has	publicly	invited	the	EU	and	AU	to	send	observation	teams,	commenting	he
also	‘is	disposed’	to	consider	an	approach	from	the	Commonwealth.	In	normal	circumstances,	Commonwealth
observation	teams	are	only	dispatched	at	the	member	country’s	express	request.	So	there	clearly	needs	to	be	some
protocol	fudges	here,	since	Zimbabwe	is	not	yet	a	member.	There	are	issues	around	cost	–	the	2002	team	was	45-
strong	–	but	there	is	a	strong	likelihood	that	this	will	be	separately	met	by	the	British	and	Australians.	Furthermore,	as
elections	are	generally	deemed	to	have	been	‘stolen’	months,	if	not	years,	before	the	election,	a	Commonwealth
election	observation	team	would	need	to	be	on	the	ground	well	in	advance	of	the	actual	polling	date.	There	remain
substantial	questions	around	whether	these	will	indeed	be	free	and	fair	elections:	there	are	outstanding	issues
around	the	appointment	of	the	Chief	Election	officer;	debates	around	whether	reforms	to	the	Electoral	Act	will	be
implemented	in	line	with	the	2013	Constitution;	concerns	over	management	of	data	collected	by	the	Biometric	Voter
Registration	(BVR)	process;	anxieties	whether	there	are	sufficiently	robust	IT	management	systems	on	collection	and
data	storage,	accessibility	and	security	of	information;	enduring	issues	around	freedom	of	the	media	(especially	local
radio)	and	coverage	of	all	political	parties;	and	whether	or	not	the	electoral	campaign	is	marred,	as	before,	by
violence	and	intimidation.
Will	Zimbabwe	then	achieve	the	perceived	‘low-hanging	fruit’	of	successful	re-engagement	with	the	Commonwealth
sufficiently	quickly	to	satisfy	the	military	mind-set?	If	the	Commonwealth	is	to	retain	its	credibility	and	not	merely
reach	comfortable	accommodation	with	ZANU-PF’s	determined	maintenance	of	power,	the	forthcoming	elections
cannot	be	taken	as	a	token	manifestation	of	adherence	to	the	democratic	values	embedded	in	the	Harare
Declaration	of	1991	and	the	Commonwealth	Charter.	A	Commonwealth	judgement	on	how	free	and	how	fair	is	going
to	be	key	to	Zimbabwe’s	reengagement.
Dr	Sue	Onslow	is	a	Senior	Lecturer	at	the	School	of	Advanced	Study	in	the	University	of	London	and	Deputy
Director	of	the	Institute	of	Commonwealth	Studies.
	
The	views	expressed	in	this	post	are	those	of	the	author	and	in	no	way	reflect	those	of	the	Africa	at	LSE
blog,	the	Firoz	Lalji	Centre	for	Africa	or	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science.
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